Because many civilian aircraft fly in U.S. Operational factors could hamper defenses.Fielding additional regional or local defenses to protect Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. CBO estimates that the lowest-cost “architectures” it examined-integrated systems that comprise airborne or space-based radars, surface-to-air missiles, and fighter aircraft-would cost roughly $75 billion to $180 billion to acquire and operate for 20 years. Modified versions of systems that the military uses today could be purchased for homeland cruise missile defense. Cruise missiles could be defeated with available technology, but a wide-area defense of the contiguous United States would be costly.Adversaries attempting such attacks could range from nonstate groups (including terrorists) that might be able to acquire a small number of missiles to “peer powers” (nations with large, advanced militaries) capable of launching much more sizable attacks. Cruise missiles could be used to attack the United States.Such coverage would be analogous to that provided by national ballistic missile defenses.ĬBO’s analysis yielded the following findings: This Congressional Budget Office report examines the potential for LACM attacks against the United States and the types of systems that might be fielded to provide a cruise missile defense with nationwide coverage. military has deployed to protect the United States from ballistic missile warheads that fly high above the atmosphere are ill-suited to counter LACMs, which fly close to Earth’s surface. In recent years, concerns have arisen that another type of weapon-land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)-may also pose a threat to the U.S. homeland from attack by long-range ballistic missiles. Since the 1980s, the United States has invested considerable resources to develop and field ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. Warning Time Versus Distance From Which LACMs Are Launched Locations of Military Bases Hosting Squadrons Equipped With Fighter Aircraft Comparison of Short-Range and Long-Range Radars in Defensive Perimeters Against Low-Altitude Targets Challenges of Positioning Components of Area Air Defenses Characteristics of the Generic Shooters in the CMD Architectures That CBO Examined Characteristics of the Generic Sensors in the CMD Architectures That CBO Examined Radar Horizon and Field of View for Generic Ground and Airborne Sensor Platforms Areas Where Cruise Missile Launchers Would Need to Be Located to Attack the Contiguous United States Estimated Coverage of Ground-Based Air Route Surveillance Radars for Targets at Two Altitudes North American Air Defense Command Forces, January 1961 Average Acquisition and Operation and Support Costs per Orbit of Sensor Aircraft That CBO Considered Change in the Cost of Variants of CBO’s Illustrative Architectures for a Homeland Cruise Missile Defense Relative to the Primary Architectures Composition and Cost of Variants of CBO’s Illustrative Architectures for a Homeland Cruise Missile Defense Composition and Cost of Illustrative Architectures for a Cruise Missile Defense of the Contiguous United States Reported Performance Characteristics of Selected Land-Attack Cruise Missiles Considerations for Aligning LACM Threats With Defensive Strategies Selected Land-Attack Cruise Missiles Worldwide Considerations for Evaluating Cruise Missile Threats Cost and Composition of Illustrative Architectures for a Cruise Missile Defense of the Contiguous United States Appendix B: How CBO Developed Its Cost Estimates.Appendix A: Variants of CBO’s Illustrative CMD Architectures.Limitations of the Primary Architectures.Primary CMD Architectures That CBO Examined and Their Costs.How CBO Constructed Illustrative CMD Architectures.Chapter 4: Capability and Cost of Illustrative Architectures for a National Cruise Missile Defense.Representative Defensive Systems and LACM Threats That CBO Used to Analyze CMD Architectures.Performance Characteristics of the Components of Cruise Missile Defenses.Characteristics of LACMs and Their Implications for Cruise Missile Defenses.Chapter 3: Technical Characteristics of Cruise Missiles and the Components of Cruise Missile Defenses.Weighing Threats in Making Decisions About Fielding a Nationwide Cruise Missile Defense.Nation-States With Regional Military Power.Chapter 2: The Likelihood of Cruise Missile Attacks Against the U.S.1990s to Today: Long-Range Missiles Proliferate.1980s: Long-Range Cruise Missiles Enter Service.1960s: Long-Range Ballistic Missiles Enter Service.Post–World War II Period: Bombers Pose the First Long-Range Threats.Chapter 1: A Brief History of Missile Threats to the U.S.Limitations of the CMD Architectures That CBO Examined.
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